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Abstract   
Agricultural commodity production in the Global South is accompanied by a range of social and 
environmental problems ranging from pollution and deforestation to labor rights violations. 
Accordingly, governments and non-state actors have responded through various governance 
initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable commodity production. While the existing literature 
focuses largely on transnational standards originating in the North, we investigate “homegrown” 
approaches in the South by asking: what explains variation in the design and features of 
sustainable commodity governance led by Southern states, businesses or NGOs? By comparing 
sustainable aquaculture governance in Thailand, Vietnam, and China, we derive a novel 
conceptualization of two distinct types of homegrown approaches – certification standards and 
capability-building programs – and suggest that the choice between the two is contingent on the 
supply of, and demand for, sustainable commodity governance. We find decisions by Southern 
governments to supply governance can lock-in top-down approaches and exclude potentially 
more impactful bottomup approaches. We therefore argue that the material resources and 
normative concerns of Southern governance entrepreneurs lead to different homegrown 
approaches. Our findings contribute theoretical insights to the literature on transnational 
governance interactions and practical observations about the utility of different approaches to 
sustainability concerns in the Global South.  
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1. Introduction 
The expansion of agricultural production creates serious sustainability challenges, including 
resource depletion, environmental pollution, and biodiversity loss (Tilman et al. 2002; Clay 2004). 
In light of the inability or unwillingness of states to create or implement policies to address these 
issues, civil society groups and businesses have initiated sustainability standards and certification 
schemes to promote sustainable commodity production in global value chains (Auld 2014; Green 
2014; van der Ven 2019). The rise of such private forms of sustainability governance has the 
potential to transform global markets (Smith et al. 2019). Usage of sustainability standards is 
growing in nearly every country and every commercial sector (Lernoud et al. 2017). When 
legitimate and credible, sustainability standards hold the potential to drive environmentally and 
socially responsible business practices (Bernstein & Cashore 2007; van der Ven 2015).  
Yet, the existing literature on sustainable commodity governance primarily focuses on 
initiatives established by actors in Northern consumer countries and primarily considers actors in 
the Global South as targets of governance (Büthe 2010)1. In this study, the Global South refers to 
developing and emerging economies, which contrast with industrialized economies in the Global 
North. While many governments in the Global South may lack the capacity or willingness to 
regulate sustainability issues, previous studies have largely overlooked the agency of Southern 
governance entrepreneurs, be they state or non-state actors. Due to this inattention, important 
questions remain unanswered about which types of governance initiatives can be created by and 
for the Global South and under what conditions. In this paper, our goal is to explain variation in 
the nature and form of “homegrown” solutions to sustainable commodity governance in the Global 
                                                          
1 We recognize that “Global South” and “Global North” are contentious terms that have been conceptualized in 
different ways over time. The terms were first articulated, to describe the economic disparity that exists between 
countries located in the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, with the exception of Australia and New Zealand in the 
South and, to some extent, China and Eastern Europe in the North (Brandt 1980).   
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South. We use “homegrown” to denote governance schemes that originate and govern within the 
same commodity producing country. While the form and content of such schemes can resemble 
initiatives that emerged in Northern countries through policy diffusion or mimetic isomorphism, 
they often bear distinct characteristics that warrant closer examination. 
Recently, studies have examined Southern actors’—especially states and industry 
associations—responses to Northern-led transnational private governance, especially the 
development of sustainability standards and certification schemes in the Global South (Hospes 
2014; Schouten & Bitzer 2015; Wijaya & Glasbergen 2016). Underscoring the emergence of such 
Southern initiatives as a new and important phenomenon in the field of sustainability governance, 
most studies in this strand have examined government-led standards in producer countries and 
conceptualized them as part of a broader strategy by Southern actors to regain authority in global 
value chains. While these studies have yielded many insights, they are primarily based on similar 
cases of government-led action that does not capture the diverse ways in which other Southern 
actors such as producer groups and NGOs respond to external pressure for sustainability 
governance. This paper examines sustainable commodity governance in the Global South in 
comparative context with a view to identifying the conditions that may lead Southern state and 
non-state actors to take particular responses.  
We ask: what explains variation in the design and features of sustainable commodity 
governance led by different Southern actors? We identify two typical forms of homegrown 
initiatives in the Global South that draw upon different governance strategies. First, there are 
standard systems, created and managed by powerful actors such as governments or industry 
associations. Standard systems use a top-down approach to regulate commodity production 
through certification and compliance verification. Elsewhere, this has been termed “rule-setting 
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governance” (Andonova et al. 2009). Second, there are capability building roundtables that draw 
upon various stakeholders within and adjacent to global value chains to define and promote codes 
of good practice. These initiatives focus less on rule-setting and more on problem-solving through 
technical assistance and organizational learning. This type may alternately be categorized as 
“information sharing” or “capacity building” governance (Andonova et al. 2009). By emphasizing 
procedural matters over substantive criteria and using less coercive sanctioning mechanisms, 
capability building programs bear a strong resemblance to the emerging practice of governing 
through best practices (Bernstein & van der Ven 2017). While we characterize standard systems 
and capability building roundtables as distinct modes of governance, in reality, there is 
considerable overlap between them. Some standard systems employ similar governance strategies 
to capability building roundtables and vice versa. However, we see value in conceptualizing these 
ideal types as important distinctions remain between them particularly when it comes to explaining 
their emergence. 
To explain the conditions that lead Southern countries to opt for one of the two governance 
forms, we compare sustainable aquaculture governance in three major Asian producer countries –
Thailand, Vietnam and China. Over the last two decades, these three value chains have shown 
important similarities in terms of their exports to Northern markets, the rise of commercial and 
intensive aquaculture production, and the existence of many small-to-medium sized household 
farms.2 Our estimation of these three aquaculture value chains’ structure is based on extensive 
field interviews as well as recent literature showing emerging trends in aquaculture value chains 
in the Global South, and Asia in particular, with the rise of commercial and increasingly intensive 
                                                          
2  We use the term “small-to-medium” to differentiate from large industrial aquaculture operations, but without 
quantifiable parameters for what this means as official data on the structure of these chains (e.g. the average size of 
farms or the share of production of household farms over the total production) is missing.  
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farms that are still characterized as small to medium sized (Belton et al. 2018; Bush et al. 2019; 
Samerwong et al. 2018; Trifković, 2014). In each of these sectors, producers supplying Northern 
markets have been the main target of Northern-led certification schemes, but various barriers exist 
for them to adopt relevant transnational standards (Ponte et al. 2014). Partly as a reaction to 
pressure to obtain a certification, homegrown governance initiatives have emerged in different 
forms. By combining web-based archival research, field interviews, and a review of secondary 
literature, we trace the processes through which sustainable commodity governance was 
established in each country. We find that while many different Southern initiatives seek to provide 
a more pragmatic solution than formal transnational standards, for sustainable development within 
a local context and strengthen the position of producers in global value chains, their characteristics 
and features vary depending on who is supplying governance. In Thailand and Vietnam, national 
governments take the lead in designing and implementing public standards for sustainable 
aquaculture. By contrast, in the Hainan province of China, the local tilapia industry, supported by 
civil society actors, has launched a multi-stakeholder roundtable to improve industry’s capacity 
for sustainable production.  
Based on the empirical evidence found in our three cases, we inductively arrive at a 
‘supply-and-demand’ based explanation for the rise of different forms of sustainable commodity 
governance in the Global South.3 Specifically, we suggest that the capability building approach is 
likely to occur when state actors do not supply a top-down standard system. Conversely, when 
local governments in Southern producer countries take action first, their early decisions often have 
path-dependent consequences that condition the nature and form of subsequent governance efforts, 
often locking into standard systems despite considerable setbacks (Auld 2014). While we do not 
                                                          
3 By focusing only on homegrown governance in Southern producing countries, we do not claim the validity of our 
findings to the governance initiatives led by Northern actors.  
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assess the effectiveness of different types of Southern homegrown governance, through this 
exercise in concept building and inductive explanation, this paper makes several contributions to 
the literature on sustainable commodity governance. First, by treating Southern states, businesses, 
and civil society groups as active rule-makers, instead of passive rule-receivers, our study adds a 
new dimension to existing research on sustainable commodity governance. Moreover, we provide 
a novel conceptualization of two different forms of homegrown governance in the Global South 
and offer a preliminary hypothesis on the conditions that lead to the emergence of one form or 
another. Our empirical work demonstrates the diversity of Southern-led initiatives and 
implications for potential North-South and public-private interactions. Lastly, the case studies on 
major producer countries yield new insights into the promise and pitfalls of certain forms of 
aquaculture governance.  
 
2. A preliminary typology of Southern-led sustainability governance 
Over the last decade, Southern producers and their governments in global value chains have begun 
to question the authority of transnational sustainability governance and even resist Northern-
developed rules by launching counter-initiatives. We identify two ideal types of Southern-led 
governance aimed at promoting sustainable production, while acknowledging that more may exist. 
Each one is characterized by a different problem-solving logic (Locke 2013; Auld et al. 2015). The 
first, and also the most common, is sustainability standard systems. Its regulatory mechanism 
focuses more on a “logic of control” as identified by Auld et al. (2015), which emphasizes 
ameliorating the environmental and social externalities of corporate behaviors by creating 
institutions that require market agents to undertake activities beneficial to society. Prescriptive 
rules, certification and accreditation, and product tracking, constitute the key features of this model, 
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although, different schemes may vary in their primary concerns, the content of standards, and the 
degree of involvement from NGOs, businesses, and governments.  
Transnational standard systems have primarily been championed by non-state actors. A 
key assumption of such schemes is that Southern governments lack the capacity or willingness to 
provide public goods and therefore need private rules to fill relevant “regulatory voids” (Börzel & 
Risse 2010). In buyer-driven global value chains, lead firms under pressure from NGOs, often ask 
their Southern suppliers to follow sustainability standards to follow practices that extend beyond 
compliance with local laws (Bernstein & Cashore 2007; Bartley 2007; van der Ven 2018). 
Certification – often in the form of independent third-party audits – is used by lead firms as a tool 
to enforce rules, monitor compliance, and reward compliant suppliers. However, this power 
asymmetry is increasingly under attack in several value chains where Southern producers have 
rapidly consolidated their market power and increased their regulatory capacity (Gereffi 2014). As 
a result, developing country governments, powerful Southern businesses, or affiliated industry 
groups may initiate their own standards to regain national sovereignty or contest the rule-making 
authority of Northern actors (Hospes 2014; Schouten & Bitzer 2015). Together, these homegrown 
initiatives in the South follow a regulatory model based on standards and certification to seek top-
down control. 
The second form of governance is capability-building programs, which feature 
prominently in Locke’s (2013) study on private labor regulation. Rather than focus on 
implementing formal rules and verifying compliance, this model acknowledges the difficulties for 
Southern producers to adopt stringent standards, and therefore promotes sustainable production 
through technical assistance, skill development, and organizational learning. Its normative 
underpinning is therefore more akin to a “logic of empowerment” with an explicit goal of 
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redistributing power and resources to marginalized actors in global value chains (Auld et al. 2015). 
The roots of the concept of capability building can be traced back to a participatory approach to 
rural development, which questions the value of assessment by external actors, but encourages 
communities to cultivate local knowledge to plan and act (Chambers 1994). For global value chain 
scholars, capability building is associated with industrial upgrading that enables the redistribution 
of power and value captured between lead firms and downstream suppliers (Kaplinsky 2000). 
Operationally, ideal capability-building programs are inclusive roundtables involving all 
stakeholders along a value chain to define and share good practices, identify and solve problems, 
and support continuous improvement (Bennett 2017, Locke 2013).  
While the logic of capability-building can be reflected in certification schemes (as in some 
Fairtrade programs), our focus is on initiatives that adopt a governance mechanism different from 
standard systems. Compared to certification schemes, capability-building programs that promote 
structured problem-solving and organizational learning have been found more effective in 
improving labor conditions in many developing countries (Locke 2013). Additionally, research on 
the fisheries sector has shown that certification is not always viable in the South, especially for 
small-scale producers who frequently lack the capacity to meet basic criteria like documentation 
and record keeping (Marschke & Wilkings 2014; Pérez-Ramírez et al. 2012). Therefore, 
capability-building roundtables based on multi-stakeholder involvement may offer a more 
pragmatic, bottom-up approach to promote sustainable practices in Southern producers. While we 
cannot comment on whether such initiatives yield better social or environmental outcomes, they 
are often more successful at engaging local stakeholders in dialogue.  
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3. Research design  
To understand the conditions leading to different types of Southern-led governance, we study the 
development of sustainable aquaculture governance in Thailand, Vietnam, and China. The three 
chosen countries are world-leading producers of farmed seafood.4 Across all cases, we focus our 
analysis on sectors that have important export markets in the Global North, are produced by many 
small to medium-size commercial farms managed by households, and are also the primary subject 
of homegrown governance. These include: shrimp for Thailand, pangasius for Vietnam, and 
Tilapia for China. This case selection strategy allows us to control for value chain structure in 
explaining the differences across the relevant initiatives.5 We draw data from government and 
NGO documents, interviews with key informants, and secondary literature. As the initiative in 
China was not covered by the scholarly literature, one of the authors did fieldwork between March 
and June 2017 to conduct 27 interviews with stakeholders in this initiative. For the cases of 
Thailand and Vietnam, we complement secondary data with 8 phone interviews with NGO 
representatives and researchers.  
 
4. Responses of Southern producer countries to transnational private governance 
4.1. Thailand: certification as a proactive government strategy 
Thailand became the world’s largest producer and exporter of farmed shrimp in the 1990s (see 
Figure 1a). Since then, with the government’s support, an integrated shrimp value chain from 
hatcheries and farms to processing and marketing companies gradually emerged, although most 
                                                          
4 As of 2015, China, Vietnam, and Thailand rank the 1st, 3rd and 12th largest aquaculture producer in the world (FAO 
2018a). 
5 We recognize that the value chain structure is an important factor explaining variation in the features of Southern 
homegrown initiatives (Bush et al. 2019). But the three cases here have shown similar value chain structure during 
the time the relevant homegrown initiatives were created (see Samerwong et al. 2018; Trifković, 2014; Wang et al. 
2016). For this reason, we do not consider the influence of value chain structure in the current study. We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for raising this point.  
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producers remain small-scale farmers (Miranda 2010). The industry has been highly export-
oriented: on average, over 95% of its production is sent abroad, especially to developed countries 
like the US (see Figure 1b). This trade relationship means the demand of Northern consumers has 
largely driven Thailand’s shrimp production, making the industry sensitive to transnational 
sustainability standards. 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Thailand’s production of farmed shrimp 1990 – 2015 (Source: FAO 2018a) 
 
Figure 1b. Export volume of Thai shrimp products 1990-2015 (Sources: FAO 2018b and USDA 
2018) 
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Shrimp is one of the first farmed seafood products to undergo controversy for its 
environmental impacts. In 1997, the Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) was established in the 
US by the shrimp industry and scientists to develop a code of practices for mangrove protection, 
and the project was later expanded as a certification scheme (BAP) operating since 2002. 
Following this move, shrimp has been targeted by other private eco-labeling schemes including 
GlobalG.A.P. and ASC (Auld 2014). Over time, certification has gained prominence in Northern 
markets, for example, in 2005 Walmart committed to sourcing only BAP-certified shrimp (van der 
Ven 2019).  
At the same time, the Thai government has been proactive in promoting sustainable shrimp 
production and improving product quality. In 1998, Thailand’s Department of Fisheries (DoF) 
issued a Code of Conduct (CoC) for sustainable aquaculture with the primary goal of upgrading 
the country’s shrimp farming system to international standards including the FAO Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Codex Alimentarius on food safety, and ISO14001 
environmental management standards (Manarungsan et al. 2005). The code was developed by the 
same technical experts as the GAA standard used at the time and modeled the latter’s framework 
(Vandergeest 2007). Yet, the CoC was too demanding and costly for many producers, especially 
small-scale ones. Hence, the DoF developed a more limited standard on Good Aquaculture 
Practice (GAP) to regulate hygiene and drug use at farms and hatcheries. While the Thai GAP bore 
a resemblance to the European-led Global GAP standard, there is no formal connection between 
the two standards. The Thai CoC and GAP initiatives together constitute the “Thai Quality Shrimp” 
program, which was a first-party certification scheme as the DoF acted simultaneously as standard 
developer and compliance auditor (Corsin et al. 2007).  
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Overall, this program was conceived as part of the government’s strategy to build a national 
reputation for quality Thai shrimp (Manarungsan et al. 2005). The relevant standards were largely 
set by government bureaucrats in consultation with industry representatives; farmers were almost 
entirely absent (Vandergeest 2007). The DoF used its extensive national network to introduce the 
standards to farmers, organize training and conduct monitoring. As a result, the program has 
emerged since the early 2000s as an important regulatory tool in Thailand’s shrimp industry. 
According to data reported by the DoF in 2008, 72% of the pond area of shrimp in Thailand was 
certified to the basic national GAP standard and researchers found that farmers commonly perceive 
this homegrown standard as mandatory (Miranda 2010; Vandergeest & Unno 2012).  
In sum, homegrown sustainability governance for Thailand’s shrimp aquaculture has been 
driven by a proactive state strategy to secure access to Northern markets. The DoF has used a top-
down approach to develop a national standard system with little involvement of farmers and other 
affected communities (Vandergeest 2007). Initially, as a first-party certification, the relevant 
standards were primarily implemented by government agencies. To support rule compliance, the 
DoF and its subnational units provided training for farmers and monitored their practices. Later, 
in an effort to present itself as equivalent to Northern-led certification schemes, the Thai 
government reformed its scheme to establish third-party verification and cover a broader set of 
sustainability issues, but the technical committee developing the new standard was still dominated 
by the state (Prompoj et al. 2011; Samerwong et al. 2018). Among its fourteen members, only two 
represent farmers (ACFS 2009). Without engaging less powerful actors such as civil society 
groups, the new scheme reemphasizes a logic of control but with stricter requirements. 
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4.2. Vietnam: VietGAP backed by the state 
Driven by pangasius farming in the Mekong river delta, Vietnam has become a leading global 
aquaculture producer. With a 30-fold increase in production volume since the late 1990s, it 
dominates today’s global pangasius supply (see Figure 2a). Pangasius is a popular, cheap 
substitute for some traditional marine species in Northern markets and export volumes have 
increased significantly in recent years (see Figure 2b). The US was originally the main destination 
of Vietnamese pangasius, but due to a high tariff imposed by the American government, the market 
has shifted since 2004 to Europe (Bush et al. 2009). While the average farm size remains small, 
the industry has increasingly become capital-intensive and further consolidated in recent years to 
establish a vertically integrated value chain linking farms and large processors (Belton et al. 2011; 
Marscheke & Wilkingson 2014; UNIDO 2015).  
 
Figure 2a. Vietnam’s production of pangasius 1997-2015 (source: FAO 2018a)  
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Pangasius became the subject of certification in the late 2000s. WWF started a stakeholder 
dialogue in 2007 to develop a sustainability standard for pangasius, which subsequently became 
an ASC standard in 2012 (ASC 2012). In the meantime, GlobalG.A.P. and BAP published their 
pangasius standards in 2009 and 2010. The scopes of these standards are similar insofar as they 
cover a range of sustainability issues (Belton et al. 2011). Together, their emergence has placed 
Vietnamese producers under increased pressure to get certified for the entry into high-end 
Northern markets. 
When transnational private certification began to rise, the Vietnamese government 
established a national sustainability standard for pangasius aquaculture. In 2011, Vietnam’s 
Directorate of Fisheries (D-Fish) issued a voluntary standard for good aquaculture practice 
(hereafter “VietGAP”).6 While sharing the GAP acronym, this too was completely independent of 
GlobalG.A.P. Originally, this initiative was motivated mainly by the government’s plan to further 
                                                          
6 VietGAP can be referred to the Vietnamese national standards for Good Agricultural Practice covering 
aquaculture, crops and livestock, but we use the term to denote the standard on aquaculture. 
Figure 2b. Export volume of Vietnamese catfish fillet 2004-2015  
 
(Source: FAO 2018b, we use catfish as a proxy as FAO does not list pangasius as a specific 
category.) 
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aquaculture industrialization and promote pangasius exports, rather than assisting producers to 
incrementally improve their practices (Nguyen 2010; Bush et al. 2009). VietGAP has mirrored 
transnational standards by addressing sustainability themes including food safety, animal welfare, 
environmental impact, and socio-economic issues (Marscheke & Wilkingson 2014; Nguyen 2015). 
It also requires third-party verification although international experts often find that the scheme 
lacks accreditation and stringent monitoring of certification bodies to control the quality of audits.7  
The creation of VietGAP coincided with an outbreak of criticisms against Vietnamese 
pangasius in Europe. In 2008, European media began to report pangasius as unsafe and 
environmentally unsustainable, and attacks became heated in 2010 after some politicians made 
sensationalist claims about pangasius’ negative impacts and WWF recommended that consumers 
avoid the fish (Bush & Dujif 2011; Little et al. 2012). Despite lacking scientific evidence, these 
criticisms have damaged pangasius’ reputation and reduced sales to Europe since 2010 (Little et 
al. 2012).  
Under the pressure of market decline, the Vietnamese government strengthened its support 
for VietGAP. In 2012, the government issued strong policies to support aquaculture projects 
compliant with VietGAP, including funding for the analysis of environmental conditions of 
production areas, training of farmers, and subsidies for certification costs.8 Meanwhile, D-Fish set 
a target of having 30% of all aquaculture establishments certified to VietGAP by 2012 and 80% 
by 2020 (VASEP 2012). In 2014, the government further increased its targets by requiring all 
commercial pangasius farms to be certified by VietGAP or an equivalent international scheme by 
the end of 2015 (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2014). Given that the implementation of VietGAP 
                                                          
7 Phone interview with a program official of a transnational certification scheme, 2 November 2017. 
8 See the government’s Decision No. 01/2012/QD-TTg, retrieved from https://thuvienphapluat.vn/van-ban/Linh-
vuc-khac/Decision-No-01-2012-QD-TTg-on-some-policies-supporting-the-application-150871.aspx.  
16 
 
is less costly than its transnational counterparts, this regulation has made VietGAP de facto 
mandatory. Through this requirement, the government aims to signal its commitment to 
sustainable aquaculture and defend charges against pangasius (White 2017). D-Fish also conceived 
VietGAP as an entry-level standard for producers to upgrade their practices, and has proactively 
sought collaboration with transnational schemes such as ASC and GlobalG.A.P, to help VietGAP-
certified producers get other certificates (ASC 2018; GlobalG.A.P. 2016). To provide more 
economic incentives for producers, the government has also attempted to promote VietGAP in the 
domestic retail market (VASEP 2013). More recently, the rise of China as the world’s largest 
market of Vietnamese pangasius may provide further opportunities for VietGAP as Chinese 
consumers’ demand for fish quality continues to increase.9  
To summarize, VietGAP is an entirely top-down initiative where the government controls 
the whole governance process from standard-setting to implementation, with little involvement of 
farmers and non-industry stakeholders. Charges of unsustainability and an ensuing decline in 
European sales has led the government to further support VietGAP and make it de facto 
compulsory in the pangasius industry. To gain buy-in from producers and buyers, the government 
has framed VietGAP as a stepping stone towards Northern-developed transnational standards, 
instead of an alternative to them. 
 
4.3. China: the emergence of a non-state capability-building roundtable  
China has been the world’s largest producer of farmed seafood since the early 1990s (FAO 2018a). 
Rapid expansion of tilapia farming in Southern China has made the country the world’s largest 
tilapia producer, representing over 40% of the global production volume (see Figure 3a). Tilapia 
                                                          
9 See FAO (2019) and this point was also mentioned in our interview with a SFP official, 16 March 2018. 
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has grown in China as an export-oriented species with more than half of the products being sent 
abroad (CAPPMA 2017). Until the mid-2000s, the US was the largest importer of Chinese tilapia, 
but more recently, other emerging markets have taken its place (see Figure 3b).  
 
 
 
Figure 3a China’s production of tilapia 1990-2015 (Source: FAO 2018a) 
 
Figure 3b. Export volume of Chinese tilapia products 2002-2015 (Sources: FAO 2018b; USDA 
2018) 
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Tilapia has been the target of several transnational certification schemes over the last 
decade. Many Chinese producers have sought certification due to American buyers’ demand, 
especially after big retailers like Walmart set requirements for their suppliers (van der Ven 2018).10 
Despite the rise of transnational governance in the global tilapia value chain, Chinese regulators 
did little to react to such pressure. In 2008, the Chinese government launched China Good 
Agricultural Practices (ChinaGAP), a beyond-compliance third-party certification scheme 
covering aquaculture. But the government’s efforts to market this scheme have remained 
insufficient in the tilapia industry with only 6 producers certified as of 2017 (Chen et al. 2017).  
The lack of government reaction to transnational certification created a governance gap in 
China’s tilapia sector. This gap is especially salient in Hainan, China’s second largest tilapia-
producing province, where the industry has been highly dependent on export sales (CAPPMA 
2017).11 Enormous barriers exist for producers in Hainan to adopt transnational standards. Nearly 
90% of the farms in the region remain small or medium-sized family operations, and most of them 
lack enough knowledge about sustainable farming to implement the technocratic transnational 
standards that are often geared towards large industrial farms (Wang et al. 2016).12 Moreover, the 
sector has yet to establish a traceability system for processors to fully identify the sources of their 
purchased fish.13 Certification costs have also reduced producers’ benefits without a stable price 
premium.14 Additionally, extreme weather and disease outbreaks over the last decade in Hainan 
                                                          
10 Interview with the secretary general of HNTSA, Haikou, 10 April 2017. 
11 The low competitiveness of Hainan tilapia in the domestic market is due to the province’s geographical location as 
China’s Southernmost island.  
12 Despite the lack of official data, aquaculture experts that we interviewed suggest that household farms account for 
the majority of tilapia production in Hainan. 
13 Interview with an NGO official working on aquaculture, Fuzhou, 30 June 2017. 
14 Interview with the secretary general of HNTSA, Haikou, 10 April 2017. 
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have further threatened the industry’s economic sustainability as many farmers, hatcheries, and 
processors went bankrupt (Wang et al. 2016).  
The willingness of Hainan’s tilapia industry to promote sustainability governance was 
triggered after Sustainable Fisheries Partnership (SFP), an international NGO, began an 
aquaculture improvement project in the region in 2011. SFP advocates “zonal aquaculture 
management” that organizes farmers during the production process to jointly control disease and 
environmental pollution (Immink 2016). Initially, SFP tried to gain support from American buyers 
to launch a zonal management project in Hainan, but these buyers only wanted farm-level 
certification (SFP 2016). To move the project forward, the then-SFP China Program Manager, Han 
Han, decided to approach local businesses. She found common interests with Hainan’s largest feed 
distributor, which has been eager to reform the industry while exploring business opportunities in 
the provision of technical services to farmers.15 With this company’s support, Han soon convinced 
a few other industry stakeholders including a feed mill, a hatchery, and two processors, to launch 
the Hainan Tilapia Sustainability Alliance (HNTSA) in November 2013.16 Despite the fact that 
Han was working for SFP, the HNTSA project was designed independently and relied on her 
personal efforts, thereby making it a homegrown governance initiative. Han later created a local 
NGO to support the initiative. 
HNTSA has been designed as a cooperative platform involving all stakeholders in the value 
chain to promote sustainable production through zonal management and product traceability.17 It 
is governed by a board of directors that represents different stakeholders, but at least half of the 
members must be farmers. To govern the production process, HNTSA set a Code of Good Practice 
                                                          
15 Interview with Han Han, Haikou, 10 April 2017. 
16 Skype interview with a SFP official, 16 March 2018; see also SFP 2016. 
17 See the Alliance’s website at http://www.hntsa.org/index.php?c=content&a=list&catid=33.  
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(CoGP) that provides technical guidance for raising safe and healthy tilapia while minimizing 
environmental pollution and disease risks (HNTSA 2015). The development of the Code started 
from roundtables in Hainan’s major production areas to collect stakeholders’ opinions; the 
Alliance then worked with Chinese experts to draft the code, and after several rounds of public 
consultation, published the first version of the CoGP in 2015 (SFP 2016). Hence, unlike 
transnational standards set by Northern experts without experience in tilapia farming, this Code is 
based on the input of local stakeholders and takes into account specific environmental conditions 
and aquaculture practices in Hainan and therefore provides a “locally-relevant solution” for 
sustainable aquaculture.18  
In lieu of performing routines audits, the Alliance has built a network of technicians to 
provide guidance for farmers and monitor indicators including water quality and disease 
occurrence on a weekly basis to facilitate farmers’ learning.19  Based in farming areas, these 
technicians – usually fish veterinarians or feed distributors – work part-time for the Alliance and 
offer their services free of charge. The data collected by the Alliance has been helpful in generating 
feedback on the Code, which was updated in 2016. According to the Alliance, their system helps 
farmers “improve their practices step by step towards a high bar” and ensures the quality of 
compliance through “long-term monitoring”.20 Since 2015, HNTSA has attracted over 50 pilot 
farms to adopt the CoGP and over 400 farmers have participated in its training on sustainable 
farming (HNTSA 2017).  Additionally, the Alliance has strived to brand Hainan tilapia by building 
connections with downstream buyers in both international and domestic markets (HNTSA 2017). 
                                                          
18 Interview with Han Han, Haikou, 10 April 2017.  
19 The weekly monitoring data are recorded in a database accessible on the Alliance’s website, 
http://www.hntsa.org/index.php?c=content&a=list&catid=51&page=6. 
20 Interview with the secretary general of HSTSA, Haikou, 10 April 2017. 
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These efforts aim at adding value to sustainably-produced tilapia in order to improve farmers’ 
well-being and increase the industry’s economic sustainability.  
Hence, HNTSA is a homegrown initiative led by “local champions” in the industry and an 
NGO.21 In contrast to standard systems, it adopts a capability-building approach to help farmers 
follow a code through technical guidance and long-term monitoring. Its code has been based on 
consultation with local stakeholders to reflect conditions in Hainan and the Alliance’s governance 
structure ensures representation of smallholders. The initiative also seeks to empower Southern 
producers in global value chains by branding Hainan-produced Tilapia. The lack of state support 
in the initial development of the Alliance have created a strong identity of being an “independent 
and multi-stakeholder” roundtable. 22  Even if government agencies have recently sought to 
collaborate with the Alliance, the latter always believe that its independence vis-à-vis the state is 
a key advantage in maintaining farmers’ support and gaining market uptake. 
 
5. Explaining variation in governance forms 
Table 1 summarizes our comparative analysis. It shows that homegrown governance in Thailand, 
Vietnam, and China takes different forms, despite the fact that each initiative emerged as a 
response to Northern-developed private governance. In Thailand and Vietnam, the state took the 
lead in developing national certification standards and implementing them through a top-down 
approach. In contrast, in the Hainan province of China, a multi-stakeholder roundtable arose from 
the bottom-up as a result of the government’s reluctance to promote a national standard. The 
resulting capacity-building effort consists of partnerships between the local industry and NGOs to 
develop a code of good practice to improve production in small-family operated farms. While 
                                                          
21 Skype interview with a SFP official, 16 March 2018. 
22 Interview with the secretary general of HSTSA, Haikou, 10 April 2017. 
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government-led standards emphasize a logic of control to reduce environmental impacts of 
aquaculture, HNTSA focuses more on empowering the local industry and improving the well-
being of farmers. 
 
 
Building on these empirical cases, we hypothesize that the supply and demand for 
governance can help explain variation in the types of sustainable commodity governance in the 
Table 1 Comparison of homegrown governance initiatives in Thailand, Vietnam, and China 
 Main objectives 
Governance 
entrepreneurs 
Institutional features  
Thai Quality Shrimp 
(became since 2009 
Thai Agricultural 
Standard on Good 
Aquaculture Practice) 
• Providing a less costly 
and more practical 
solution to assure 
product quality 
• Regaining regulatory 
sovereignty & 
incorporating local 
knowledge 
• Maintaining market 
access 
Department of Fisheries, 
Ministry of Agricultural 
and Cooperatives of 
Thailand 
• Initially first-party 
certification, later 
changed to third-party 
• Voluntary standard 
• Top-down, state-led 
standard 
VietGAP 
• Increasing productivity 
and output 
• Providing an easier way 
towards sustainable 
production  
• Protecting exports & 
promoting quality 
products domestically 
Directorate of Fisheries, 
Ministry of Agriculture 
and Rural Development 
of Vietnam 
 
• Third-party 
certification  
• Initially voluntary, 
became de facto 
mandatory in 2014 
• Top-down, state-led 
standard  
Hainan Tilapia 
Sustainability 
Alliance 
• Improving farming 
practices by considering 
local circumstances 
• Enabling coordination & 
cooperation among 
stakeholders along the 
value chain  
• Branding Hainan Tilapia 
& expanding the market 
• Kingwin Aquaculture 
Ltd., a feed distributor 
in Hainan 
• Sustainable Fisheries 
Partnership, then a 
local NGO - China Blue 
• No certification 
requirement, but 
regular monitoring 
• Smallholders have 
strong representation  
• Bottom-up, multi-
stakeholder capacity 
building program 
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Global South. The supply-and-demand analytical lens has been widely used by transnational 
governance scholars to conceptualize the rise of private institutions: supply refers to actors’ 
expertise, economic power, or moral authority; demand indicates the anticipated benefits of 
solving cooperation problems (Büthe 2010; Green 2014). By focusing explicitly on the agency of 
Southern actors, we suggest that while similar incentives (demand) may be at play in driving 
different types of initiatives, powerful governance entrepreneurs in the South, like states, are likely 
to supply standard systems whereas less powerful actors like NGOs and producer groups tend to 
opt for a capability-building approach. Figure 4 illustrates the hypothesized pathways leading to 
the two types of homegrown sustainability governance in the South.  
 
 
5.1 Demand 
On the demand side, we find that all the initiatives in our study have served mainly as a 
response to preexisting transnational governance led by Northern actors. Looking at the claims of 
these initiatives, we find three similarities in their motivations. First, they all aim to provide less 
costly and more feasible solutions than Northern-developed governance for improving farming 
practices and product quality. In Thailand, government-led certification may bring benefits to 
farmers with less financial burden. In Vietnam, the government framed the standard as an easier 
Figure 4 A model explaining the rise of sustainable commodity governance in the Global South 
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way for farmers to build a clean seafood value chain and a stepping stone towards transnational 
standards. In China, the HNTSA’s founders have aimed to provide an alternative to costly and 
regionally-irrelevant standards set by Northern actors through free technical assistance and 
continuous training for farmers. Each of our cases responds to the domination of Northern 
businesses in global value chains and the marginalization of Southern stakeholders in the 
transnational standard systems (Klooster 2006; Hospes 2014).  
Second, these Southern-led initiatives meet the demand to consider local circumstances 
and knowledge in sustainability standards or codes. This demand has been especially strong in 
Thailand and China. Vandergeest & Unno (2012) have shown that Thai state officials find 
transnational private certification unwilling or unable to consider local knowledge. In China, 
HNTSA has noted a strong intention to develop a code based on local conditions and knowledge 
from stakeholders in Hainan in order to more effectively address challenges that producers face. 
Therefore, Southern actors initiate sustainability governance to correct over-simplified and often 
technocratic Northern-led standards (Belton et al. 2009; Ponte & Cheyns 2013).  
Lastly, homegrown initiatives in all three countries seek to build the reputation of Southern 
producers, and ultimately help secure or expand their business in existing or new markets. Some 
variation exists in this respect as Thai standards have mainly spoken to international markets 
whereas both VietGAP and HNTSA have also aimed to expand their domestic market presence. 
Notably, HNTSA has been particularly eager to build a regional brand in the fast-growing Chinese 
market. From this perspective, the rise of domestic or other Southern markets could be important 
for the emergence of homegrown sustainability governance in the Global South. This dynamic 
seems particularly salient to the aquaculture sector in the Global South where the majority of 
production is aimed at satiating growing domestic demand (Belton et al. 2018). If homegrown 
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initiatives begin to gain traction with buyers or consumers in emerging markets, then we can expect 
them to become even stronger in the future. Therefore, growing consumption in the Global South 
can provide opportunities for Southern-led governance to get buy-in in domestic and other 
emerging markets, especially when Northern-led schemes have been far from popular in these 
markets (Wijaya & Glasbergen 2016; Schleifer & Sun 2018).  
 
5.2 Supply 
While there is considerable overlap on the demand side, we can see significant variation in the 
actors supplying homegrown governance in each of the three cases. Considering the power of 
different actors, we identify two typical clusters of governance entrepreneurs that may place 
countries on different pathways. Our case studies on Thailand and Vietnam suggest that when the 
state plays a dominant role in launching homegrown governance, they are likely to take a top-
down approach focused on rule-setting through standards and certifications. They are able to do 
so since they enjoy the unique authority of setting and implementing domestic regulations (Bartley 
2014). Given the importance of shrimp and pangasius exports for Thailand and Vietnam 
respectively, government-led standard systems emerged in the Global South because the stakes of 
these commodities are high for the domestic economy. This type of initiative thus emphasizes a 
logic of control to provide solutions more suitable to Southern producers. Depending on their 
interests and capacity, Southern states can choose to make their standards either voluntary or 
mandatory.  
By contrast, when government is slow or reluctant to act, producers and NGOs may emerge 
as governance entrepreneurs. This is the case in Hainan, China, where producers and NGOs started 
their own bottom-up governance initiative to address problems in tilapia farming. Absent the rule-
making authority of the state, less powerful governance entrepreneurs choose multi-stakeholder 
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roundtables to collectively define rules and incrementally improve practices as a means of gaining 
buy-in and legitimacy with producers. This technique appeals to upstream producers who often 
feel marginalized in global value chains, thereby increasing the chances for local buy-in. The lack 
of state involvement is critical to the rise of HNTSA and its CoGP. In this case, the limited 
economic significance of tilapia industry has prevented Chinese national and local governments 
from developing and enforcing their own standards. Hence, a window of opportunity opened for 
non-state actors in Hainan to supply governance.  
 
5.3 Path-dependence of sustainable commodity governance  
Our cases suggest that path-dependent processes can consolidate early choices made by 
governance entrepreneurs and increase their institutional variation over time (Auld 2014). In the 
case of HNTSA in China, the early decision to not include government representatives has 
gradually come to form an important aspect of program’s identity. According to them, the local 
government has a different agenda than the industry such that “they (government officials) could 
close the project down or drive it towards something different if they knew the initial process”.23 
Accordingly, from the very beginning, the relevant governance entrepreneurs have believed that 
the government cannot understand their motivations and consider their independence a priority. 
This strategy persists even if many government agencies have, over time, become willing to 
support the Alliance. Following a similar logic, the fact that the Thai and Vietnamese governments 
developed their own standards in response to transnational certification has hindered the 
emergence of bottom-up initiatives like HNTSA in these countries.24 In Vietnam, the government 
                                                          
23 Interview with a founder of the Alliance, Haikou, 10 April 2017. 
24 Skype interview with a SFP official, 16 March 2018. 
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strengthened its top-down approach to promote homegrown governance by making VietGAP 
mandatory, thereby negating the chance of other initiatives to gain a foothold.  
 
6. Conclusion 
While a vibrant literature has emerged to explore the interaction of transnational private 
governance systems (Eberlein et al. 2014), comparatively less effort has examined the responses 
of Southern actors—including states, businesses and NGO—to these systems. Too often, Southern 
producer countries are portrayed as the passive targets of governance. Our analysis offers a 
corrective by conceptualizing Southern actors as active governance entrepreneurs. Recognizing 
the diversity of governance created by and for Southern actors, we identify two types of sustainable 
commodity governance with different problem-solving logics that are likely to emerge in the South: 
top-down standard systems and bottom-up capability-building roundtables. The latter has received 
scant attention in the existing literature on sustainable commodity governance.  
We assess conditions leading to the emergence of different types of homegrown 
governance for sustainable aquaculture in Thailand, Vietnam and China. While initiatives in all 
three countries have attempted to provide easier solutions for farmers to achieve sustainable 
production, promote locally adapted standards, and secure or expand market access, the 
governments of these countries have responded differently in accordance with the importance of 
the particular aquaculture industry to the national economy. In Thailand and Vietnam, the national 
governments moved quickly to establish standard systems to protect the reputation of their 
producers in global markets and safeguard vital industries. By contrast, when an industry is less 
integral to the national economy, as in China’s tilapia industry, and the government does not take 
the lead, private actors like businesses and civil society groups pilot their own initiatives using the 
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capability-building model to promote good practices and long-term learning for sustainable 
production.  
Based on this initial research, we propose a supply-and-demand based explanation for 
variation in the form of Southern-led homegrown initiatives. We suggest that, while similar 
demand-related factors motivate Southern actors to launch initiatives of both types, ultimately, the 
type of sustainable commodity governance is determined by who supplies it. Specifically, state-
sponsored programs tend to be top-down standard-setting efforts, whereas industry and civil 
society-led initiatives tend to be bottom-up capability-building efforts. Considering the evolution 
of different initiatives, we also suggest that early decisions on the governance model made by the 
suppliers have path-dependent consequences that condition the nature and form of subsequent 
efforts. Of course, this hypothesis is based on a small number of cases and requires further testing 
across a larger and more diverse sample of countries in the Global South. Nonetheless, we see this 
as an important area for future research. 
The extant literature on transnational private governance interactions tends to focus on two 
potential outcomes: “racing-to-the-top” where competition lead to higher standards or “racing-to-
the-bottom” where the existence of multiple standards leads standard-setters to lower the bar for 
certification (Fransen 2011). Our analysis recognizes the emergence of Southern-led governance 
as a means of challenging the hegemony of Northern standards, but suggests that it is not as simple 
as racing-to-the-bottom. Depending on the governance suppliers, homegrown initiatives may hold 
a better chance of gaining local stakeholders support, domestic market uptake, and creating 
meaningful behavioral change due to their careful attention to local context. Hence, the effects of 
the interaction are more complex than often theorized. Homegrown governance approaches have 
the potential to provide a tiered response to achieving certification and to reach more producers 
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(Tlusty et al. 2016). Being less costly and better adapted to local conditions, they may complement 
transnational standards and provide a pathway to higher levels of sustainability certification. 
Ultimately, any conclusion about the social and environmental outcomes of different types of 
governance may be premature, but capability-building roundtables, as the less prevalent of the two 
types of governance, certainly offer advantages in terms of their accessibility to local producers, 
ability to catalyze long-term learning, and adaptability to local conditions. At the same time, some 
state-led Southern standards appear purposefully designed to replace transnational standards, 
especially when they become mandatory, and therefore may simply be an instrument to expand 
the state’s control over producers.  
To conclude, we draw attention to some of the challenges and limitations facing 
homegrown sustainability governance in the Global South. For government-led standards, the 
closed-door approach to rule-making process and lack of capacity building may impede efforts to 
deliver relevant solutions for smallholders (Marschke & Wilkings 2014). For capability building-
programs, economic sustainability is a key concern as initiatives like HNTSA often rely on donors’ 
support, and accordingly, market recognition is needed for the Alliance continuing to provide free 
services. As Southern-led governance initiatives remain in their infancy, debates may continue 
about their advantages compared to transnational sustainability standards. Of particular interest is 
the question of whether homegrown governance can successfully complement existing 
transnational certification without ‘racing-to-the-bottom’ and lowering the bar for the industry 
(Tlusty et al. 2016). Further research into the complementary or competitive nature of governance 
interactions is needed to address this question. However, if homegrown initiatives are in fact a 
better way of engaging Southern producers, then Northern NGOs and donors might better direct 
their resources towards supporting local actors to develop homegrown solutions.  
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